Zero Say. Zero traces, 100% privacy.

Zero Say is a set of privacy tools made by a small team in Sweden. There are two apps: Zero Say Messenger, an end-to-end encrypted messenger that never asks who you are, and Zero Say Browser, a browser that routes every tab through Tor, blocks trackers and forgets everything when you close it. Both are free, collect nothing, and come with a page that states exactly what they protect and where that stops.

Your messages are encrypted on your device with keys that only exist on your devices. The server relays sealed envelopes it cannot open. It never has the keys, so there is nothing it could hand over, leak or sell.

No. A Zero Say account is a random identifier plus a key pair generated on your device. You share a handle or a QR code, not your number, and we never ask for access to your contacts.

Almost nothing. A random account identifier, your public keys, a handle if you invented one, and any sealed message still waiting to be delivered. That is the whole list. No name, no phone number, no email address, no contacts, no profile, no analytics, no advertising identifier, and no crash reports — crash reporting is switched off in the build, not merely defaulted off. We are not even told who sends a message to whom.

An app lock, and then the app fighting back. Set a passphrase or use Touch ID, and Zero Say locks itself after an idle period, when the machine sleeps and when the screen locks. While locked, the key to the local database is dropped from memory, so the app cannot read your messages either. Wrong passphrases are counted, and the count survives quitting the app, so relaunching does not buy anyone a fresh three. After the third the passphrase stops working entirely and only your 12-word recovery phrase gets back in, or an enforced wait, whichever you chose. If you choose the option that erases instead, the fifth wrong attempt destroys the database, the keys and the cached media on that computer, and the app warns before the last try. There is also a panic wipe on one keyboard shortcut, which removes all of that and deletes your account on our server as well.

We cannot read them, so there is nothing readable to hand to anyone: not a police force, not a prosecutor, not a government agency here or abroad. We hold no key to any message, and the app never tells us who sends to whom, so there is no contact list and no record of who spoke to whom to produce either. What an order can reach is the short list above: a random account identifier, public keys, a handle if you chose one, and any sealed envelope still waiting for delivery, which is ciphertext we cannot open.

What is on the lost device is behind the app lock, which engages on its own when the screen locks or the device sleeps. If you chose the option that erases, five wrong passphrases destroy the database, the keys and the cached media on that device, and anyone guessing gets three tries before the passphrase stops working at all. There is no remote wipe and there will not be one: a server able to order your app to erase itself is a server that could be made to point at you. What you can do is restore your identity on a new device with your 12-word phrase and delete the account, which removes anything still waiting for delivery and stops new messages ever reaching the old device. Old messages themselves are gone without the phrase, and we cannot recover them. That is the trade: nobody can restore what nobody but you could read.